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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOSE BALTARCAR ROYBAL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060911-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
& J< & 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of driving under the 
influence of alcohol, a third degree felony. R. 66-67. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the officer have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop 
of defendant's vehicle after defendant's live-in girlfriend called 911 and told the 
dispatcher that defendant had "been drinking" during a domestic dispute and was now 
driving away from their home?1 
1
 In his Statement of the Issues, defendant identifies the issue on appeal as being 
whether defendant was "detained for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when the officer 
stopped him as he was driving his car." Aplt. Br. 1 (capitalization omitted). Defendant 
does not address this question in the Argument section of his brief, however, but instead 
focuses on whether the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Aplt. 
Br. 6-14. 
The State agrees that defendant was detained for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment when Sergeant Ledford pulled him over. See State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 
Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress, this Court reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error and its legal 
conclusions for correctness. State v. Dunkel, 2006 UT App 339, |6 , 143 P.3d 290. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 29, 2005, defendant was charged with one count of driving under the 
influence of alcohol and one count of violating a no alcohol conditional license. R. 1. 
On January 26, 2006, defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence derived from the 
initial traffic stop. R. 23-24. Defendant argued that officers did not have reasonable 
suspicion that he had committed any crime prior to effectuating the stop. R. 23-24. The 
State responded that officers had reasonable suspicion that either (1) defendant was 
driving while under the influence of alcohol, or (2) defendant had committed an act of 
domestic violence. R. 45-50. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied defendant's motion. R. 56-59. In 
its oral ruling, the court determined that the stop was justified because the initial 911 call 
101,^ll,68P.3d 1043. The State disagrees with defendant's contention that this stop 
was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The State's brief is accordingly directed at 
that argument. 
2 
provided officers with reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while under the 
influence of alcohol. R. 95: 23-25.2 
On July 19, 2006, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of 
driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony. R. 66-67. Defendant was 
sentenced on October 5, 2006, and filed an amended notice of appeal on October 11, 
2006. R. 85-87, 90.3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately six p.m. on August 8, 2005, R. 95: 3, defendant's live-in 
girlfriend called 911 and told the dispatcher that she needed officers to "get over here 
quick." R. 96: 1. After verifying her address and phone number, defendant's girlfriend 
told the dispatcher that "[t]he person that's been living with me is an a and I want 
him the f— out of here." R. 96: 1. When the dispatcher asked her whether she had been 
assaulted, defendant's girlfriend responded "[j]ust about, yeah." R. 96: 1. Upon further 
questioning, defendant's girlfriend reiterated that defendant had not completed an assault. 
R: 96: 2 ("Q: And he hasn't assaulted you? [A]: No."). 
Defendant's girlfriend also told the dispatcher that she and defendant had been 
drinking prior to their domestic dispute: 
Dispatcher: Has he been drinking? 
[Defendant's girlfriend]: Yes. 
After orally issuing its ruling from the bench, the trial court directed the 
prosecutor to prepare the written order. R. 95: 24. It does not appear that a written order 
was ever prepared or signed. 
3
 Defendant's original notice of appeal was filed prior to the entry of sentence and 
therefore not timely. R. 83-84, 90. 
3 
Dispatcher: He has been drinking? 
[Defendant's girlfriend]: We both have. We both have. And you might have to 
take both of. I don't even give a s—, I just want him out. 
R. 96: 2. At this point, the dispatcher attempted to calm defendant's girlfriend down, 
telling her to "take a couple of deep breaths." R. 96: 2. 
Defendant's girlfriend then gave defendant's full name, his age, and his ethnicity. 
R. 96: 2-3. She also told the dispatcher that defendant was "out putting stuff in his van" 
and was "leaving." R. 96: 2. When pressed for details, defendant's girlfriend explained 
that he was driving a white 1985 GMC van with a partial license plate number of 883. R. 
96: 3-4. After defendant pulled out of the driveway, defendant's girlfriend told the 
dispatcher which road defendant was traveling on and which direction he was heading. 
R. 96: 3. 
The 911 dispatcher sent out a bulletin requesting the assistance of officers. R. 54. 
Sergeant Chad Ledford was in the area and responded to the bulletin. R. 54. The 911 
dispatcher informed him that a "male and a female [were] verbally fighting, no weapons, 
both parties are very intoxicated." R. 54. The dispatcher identified defendant and gave 
the make and color of his vehicle, as well as his direction of travel. R. 54. The 
dispatcher also indicated that defendant was "1055." R. 54. Sergeant Ledford later 
explained that "1055" is "an abbreviated code for police officers, dispatchers, to cut 
down on the air time," and "means an intoxicated driver." R. 97: 4. The 1055 code is not 
conclusive, but is instead used "as an indicator that the person may be DUI at that point." 
4 
R. 97: 5. Even when a 1055 code has been issued, Sergeant Ledford still conducts field 
sobriety tests before citing a suspect for driving under the influence. R. 97: 5. 
Shortly after receiving the 911 dispatch, Sergeant Ledford was stopped at an 
intersection when he noticed a white van approach from the street to his right. R. 97: 5. 
Based on the description given by the dispatcher, Sergeant Ledford suspected that the van 
may have been defendant's. R. 97: 5-6. As Sergeant Ledford proceeded through the 
intersection, he contacted dispatch and verified that the license plate number on the white 
van matched defendant's license plate number. R. 97: 5-6. 
In the meantime, the white van idled at the intersection "for a few seconds" before 
turning right. R. 97: 7. Sergeant Ledford thought that this was odd because there was no 
oncoming traffic that would have caused the delay. R. 97: 7. After making the turn, the 
white van approached Sergeant Ledford at a slow speed. R. 97: 7. It appeared to 
Sergeant Ledford that the white van "was hoping the red light would change" and that 
Sergeant Ledford would go through the intersection before it could arrive. R. 97: 7. The 
light did not immediately turn green, however, and Sergeant Ledford was able to confirm 
that the van was defendant's as it approached him from behind. R. 97: 6. 
Defendant pulled next to Sergeant Ledford at the red light and "sat there for a few 
seconds." R. 97: 6. "There was no traffic coming," and defendant then turned right again 
and traveled down that road at a slow speed as well. R. 97: 6. Sergeant Ledford 
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followed him as defendant made another right-hand turn at the next intersection, still 
traveling below the speed limit. R. 97: 6.4 
Sergeant Ledford has been trained to look for certain driving characteristics that 
indicate impaired driving. R. 97: 9. According to Sergeant Ledford, 
when someone has been drinking they're [sic] fine motor skills are the first 
thing that are affected, so their overall movements are slower, their thinking 
is slower, they're less likely to be more alert so they slow down their 
vehicles, they drive slower to try to make sure they can negotiate turns, red 
lights, stop signs, things like that. 
R. 97: 9-10. In addition, impaired drivers will "try to avoid police cars, they'll slow 
down, they'll try to stay behind you so they don't get in front of you so you have a reason 
to pull them over." R. 97: 10. Sergeant Ledford suspected that defendant was impaired 
at this point because he had observed defendant engaging in these exact behaviors. R. 
97:9. 
Sergeant Ledford also suspected that defendant had committed an act of domestic 
violence. This suspicion was not only based on the 911 call, but also on the fact that 
defendant was driving a slow, circular pattern that was only eight blocks away from the 
4
 At the preliminary hearing, Sergeant Ledford testified that the white van was 
traveling "about "20, 25 miles an hour." R. 95: 3. At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, 
however, Sergeant Ledford testified that the van was initially traveling "no more than 
five miles an hour," and that it had only increased its speed to "no more than ten miles an 
hour at the most" by the end of the encounter. R. 97: 6-7. Defendant did not testify at 
either hearing, nor did he offer any contrary evidence regarding his speed of travel. 
The trial court ultimately based its ruling on the 911 call alone, and it therefore did 
not issue any findings regarding defendant's speed. R. 95: 24-25. Regardless of whether 
defendant was traveling 5 miles an hour or 25 miles an hour, however, it is unrefuted that 
defendant was traveling below the speed limit at all times. R. 97: 23; see also R. 95: 3, 
14 (indicating that the speed limit on the initial road was 40 miles an hour, and the speed 
limits on the subsequent roads vary between 30 to 35 miles an hour). 
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victim's residence. R. 97: 8, 22. According to Sergeant Ledford, "[a] lot of time we deal 
with [domestic violence] suspects that will leave the house initially, they'll wait to see if 
the police are going to show up and if the police don't show up within a few minutes, 
they tend to come back to the scene." R. 97: 8-9. 
Sergeant Ledford followed defendant "for about another block or so," and then 
initiated his emergency lights and pulled defendant over. R. 97: 6. Sergeant Ledford 
later stated that the "primary reason" for pulling defendant over was the 911 dispatch 
indicating that defendant had been involved in a domestic violence incident. R. 97: 17-
18. When questioned by defendant's counsel, however, Sergeant Ledford stated that he 
also pulled defendant over because he suspected that defendant was driving under the 
influence: 
Q: So when you saw this vehicle and based on this type of dispatch then you 
wanted to pull it over and find out what was going on and see if it was a drunk 
driver, see if he was very intoxicated and see about the domestic violence? 
A: Yes, and maybe not necessarily in that order. 
Q: Not necessarily but those various things? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And initiating your stop? 
A: Correct. 
R. 97:21-22. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that Sergeant Ledford did not have reasonable suspicion that he 
had committed any crime and that the investigatory stop was therefore unlawful. This 
Court should reject that argument for two reasons. 
First, the 911 call provided Sergeant Ledford with reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol, thereby justifying an 
investigatory stop. Even if the 911 call itself was not independently sufficient to 
establish reasonable suspicion, this Court should still hold that the stop was justified 
based on defendant's driving behavior. 
Second, the 911 call also provided Sergeant with reasonable suspicion that 
defendant had committed an act of domestic violence, and that suspicion was 
strengthened when defendant was seen driving a slow, circuitous pattern in the area of the 
victim's home after the 911 call had been placed. Sergeant Ledford was therefore 
justified in stopping defendant to investigate the domestic violence allegation. 
ARGUMENT 
SERGEANT LEDFORD NOT ONLY HAD REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, BUT ALSO THAT DEFENDANT HAD 
COMMITTED AN ACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Defendant claims that the investigatory stop was unconstitutional because 
Sergeant Ledford "did not have reasonable suspicion that [he] had committed any type of 
crime." Aplt. Br. 6. This Court should reject that argument. 
8 
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit "'all searches and seizures, but [only] 
unreasonable searches and seizures.5" State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, \\ 1, 68 P.3d 
1043 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). It is well-established that officers are 
permitted to conduct brief investigatory stops where there is "reasonable suspicion to 
believe that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 
(2002) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Investigatory stops are not limited to 
ongoing or prospective crimes, but can also be based on reasonable suspicion that the 
suspect "has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. Markland, 
2005 UT 26410, 112P.3d507. 
"In order to justify such a detention, the officer's suspicion must be supported by 
'specific and articulable facts and rational inferences.'" Id. (citation omitted). "A 
determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of 
innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. "This is because the public interest in 
investigating criminal activity is sufficiently important to justify the minimal intrusion 
into personal security that such investigatory detentions entail." Markland, 2005 UT 26 
at <[jl7. Thus, even when all aspects of a defendant's conduct are "susceptible of innocent 
explanation," a court still may properly conclude that the officers had a "particularized 
and objective basis" for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. In 
making this determination, officers are allowed to "draw on their own experience and 
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative 
information available to them that might well elude an untrained person." Id. at 273. 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
9 
A. Sergeant Ledford had reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving 
while under the influence of alcohol. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's conclusion that the 911 call provided 
officers with reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while under the influence 
of alcohol. In the alternative, this Court should affirm the stop based on defendant's 
suspicious driving pattern. 
a. The investigatory stop was justified because the 911 dispatcher 
received a report that defendant uhad been drinking" and was 
now driving. 
It is well-settled that "an investigating officer may rely on a flyer or bulletin from 
other police departments to justify an investigative stop, but only 'if the police who 
issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop.'" State v. 
Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 
U.S. 221, 232 (1985) (emphasis in original)). When officers stop a person based on a 911 
dispatch, the admissibility of the resulting evidence "turns on whether the officers who 
issued the flyer possessed" reasonable suspicion, and "does not turn on whether those 
relying on the flyer were themselves aware of the specific facts which led their colleagues 
to seek their assistance." Hensley, 469 U. S. at 231 (emphasis in original).5 The 911 
dispatcher in this case received a phone call from defendant's girlfriend indicating that he 
"has been drinking" and that he was now driving, and the dispatcher then issued the 1055 
code as a result. R. 54, 96: 2-4. The initial question under Hensley is whether the 911 
5
 "The term 'flyer,' . . . has been taken to mean any information intended to 
prompt investigation that is transmitted through police channels, regardless of method." 
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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call provided the 911 dispatcher with reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving 
while under the influence of alcohol. This Court should hold that it did. 
As noted above, an officer is not required to have proof of criminal activity before 
initiating an investigatory stop. Rather, an officer simply needs to have a "reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity." Markland, 2005 UT 26 at ^10 (internal quotations and citation omitted). While 
an officer cannot rely on an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch," an 
officer is allowed to rely on the "rational inferences" that arise from the facts at his or her 
disposal. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). "[T]he likelihood of criminal 
activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably 
short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. 
The question is ultimately whether the officer "could have reasonably suspected that 
criminal activity was afoot considering his knowledge" of the situation. Markland, 2005 
UT26at^25n.2. 
The 911 dispatcher in this case did not rely on an unparticularized hunch, but 
instead relied on the specific facts and inferences derived from the 911 call. Defendant's 
girlfriend had not simply said that defendant had had "a drink," but instead stated that he 
"ha[d] been drinking." R. 96: 2. Though subtle, the difference between these two 
phrases was highly significant. This phraseology clearly conveyed the message that 
11 
defendant had had multiple drinks, and it also implied that the drinking had occurred over 
a sustained period of time.6 
Defendant's girlfriend also indicated that she and defendant had been drinking 
together. R. 96:2. When the trial court subsequently listened to a recording of the call, 
the judge specifically noted that defendant's girlfriend sounded intoxicated during the 
call. R. 95: 23-24. Given that she had apparently drunk herself to the point of 
intoxication with defendant, the 911 dispatcher could reasonably infer that defendant had 
also had a large number of drinks. 
The dispatcher was entitled to rely on all of this information. It is well-accepted 
that 911 calls are deemed more reliable when the caller identifies himself or herself. See 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000). A call is also deemed more reliable where the 
caller provides a "quantity" of verifiable information. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 
330 (1990). In this case, defendant's girlfriend identified herself by her full name, and 
she freely gave her address and phone number to the dispatcher as well. R. 96: 1. She 
identified defendant with specificity, providing his full name, age, and ethnicity, as well 
as the make, year, color, and partial license plate number of his car. R. 96: 2-4. This call 
was reliable, and the 911 dispatcher was therefore justified in believing that defendant 
had been drinking and was now driving. 
An officer is not required to develop proof that a driver is intoxicated prior to 
initiating a stop, but is instead only required to develop reasonable suspicion that the 
6
 For example, one would not say that he "has been running" if he had only run 
down the stairs, nor would a person say that he "has been eating" if he had only taken a 
single bite. 
12 
driver might be intoxicated. Here, defendant's live-in girlfriend called 911 in an agitated, 
intoxicated state, and she then told the dispatcher that though defendant had had multiple 
drinks, he was now driving. The dispatcher should not have been required to ask her to 
count the empty bottles and describe defendant's body mass before issuing the alert, nor 
should she have had to wait to hear that defendant was swerving on public roads. 
Instead, the 911 dispatcher was justified in suspecting that if defendant's girlfriend had 
drunk herself to the point of intoxication, defendant might be impaired as well. She was 
therefore justified in sending out the 1055 alert, thereby providing Sergeant Ledford with 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while impaired.7 
b. The investigatory stop was also justified because Sergeant 
Ledford observed defendant driving in a manner consistent with 
impaired drivers. 
Even if this Court holds that the 911 call alone was not sufficient to provide 
reasonable suspicion, this Court should still hold that Sergeant Ledford developed 
n 
Defendant notes that in addition to issuing a 1055 code, the dispatcher told 
officers that defendant was "highly intoxicated." Aplt. Br. 8. The dispatch transcript that 
was submitted below, however, indicates that the dispatcher described defendant as being 
"very intoxicated." R. 54. Regardless, defendant's focus on the dispatcher's use of an 
extra adverb is misplaced. Driving under the influence of alcohol is illegal under Utah 
Code Annotated § 41-6a-502 (West 2004). While that section does not actually use the 
term "intoxicated," Utah's courts have followed common usage patterns in stating that it 
is illegal to drive while "intoxicated." See, e.g., State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, 
ffi[7-8, 127 P.3d 1265, cert granted 133 P.3d 437 (Utah 2006). 
The dispatcher's use of an adverb therefore did not make defendant's conduct any 
more or less illegal, and officers would still have had reasonable suspicion that defendant 
was committing a crime even if the dispatcher had only stated that he was "intoxicated." 
The dispatcher's use of the term "very" or "highly" was irrelevant to the reasonable 
suspicion analysis, and it was therefore appropriately disregarded by the trial court below. 
R. 95:23-24. 
13 
reasonable suspicion prior to effectuating the stop. 
After receiving a report indicating that defendant "may be DUI at that point/' 
Sergeant Ledford observed defendant's vehicle approach an intersection from the road to 
his right. R. 97: 5. Although there was no traffic that would have delayed his turn, 
defendant nevertheless waited at the intersection "for a few seconds55 before turning. R. 
97: 7. Defendant then approached Sergeant Ledford from the rear at slow speeds. R. 97: 
7. Even though there was still "no traffic coming/5 defendant "sat there for a few 
seconds" before again turning right. R. 97: 6. Defendant then drove down that road at 
slow speeds before making yet another right-hand turn. R. 97: 6. 
Defendant points out that none of this conduct was illegal. Aplt. Br. 12-13. It did 
not have to be illegal, however, in order to create reasonable suspicion that something 
illegal may have been afoot. In Arvizu, for example, the Supreme Court held that officers 
had reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle where the vehicle had taken an odd, rural 
route that was often used by smugglers to avoid police checkpoints; the vehicle was 
traveling away from, rather than toward, any known recreational areas; the vehicle 
"slowed dramatically55 when it approached a marked police car; the driver's posture 
"appeared stiff5 and "rigid55; and the driver "seemed to be trying to pretend that [the 
officer] was not there.55 534 U.S. at 269-72. A unanimous Supreme Court concluded that 
8
 As explained above, the trial court based its ruling on the 911 call. However, 
"'[a]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs 
from that stated by the [district] court to be the basis of its ruling or action.'55 State v. 
RynharU 2005 UT 84, TJ10 ,125 P.3d 938 (citation omitted). 
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although "each of these factors alone is susceptible of innocent explanation/' they did 
"suffice[ ] to form a particularized and objective basis" for stopping the vehicle when 
"[fjaken together." Id. at 277. In reaching this result, the Court emphasized that the 
officers are allowed to "draw on their own experience and specialized training to make 
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them." Id. 
at 273. 
Here, Sergeant Ledford's training has taught him that impaired drivers will "try to 
avoid police cars, they'll slow down, they'll try to stay behind you so they don't get in 
front of you so you have a reason to pull them over." R. 97: 10. In light of defendant's 
slow speeds and unnecessary delays at the intersections, it appeared to Sergeant Ledford 
that defendant was engaged in exactly this behavior. R. 97: 7-8. Sergeant Ledford's 
training has also taught him that when someone has been drinking, "their overall 
movements are slower, their thinking is slower, they're less likely to be more alert so 
they slow down their vehicles, they drive slower to try to make sure they can negotiate 
turns, red lights, stop signs, things like that." R. 97: 9-10. According to Sergeant 
Ledford, defendant's driving was characterized by "slow deliberate movements" and was 
therefore consistent with that of an impaired driver. R. 97: 9. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, this Court's opinion in State v. Yazzie, 2005 
UT App 261, 116 P.3d 969, does not compel a different result. In Yazzie, the officer 
pulled the defendant over because he suspected that the defendant did not have a valid 
driver's license. Id. at \2. The officer subsequently admitted that this suspicion was 
predicated on nothing more than the fact that the defendant had not had a driver's license 
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during previous police encounters. Id On appeal, this Court found that the stop was 
unconstitutional because the State had failed to point to any basis for suspecting that 
defendant did not have a license on this particular occasion. Id. at | 11 . In contrast, 
Sergeant Ledford suspected that defendant was impaired on August 8, 2005, because he 
had received a dispatch just moments prior indicating that defendant was intoxicated, and 
because he personally observed defendant driving in a manner that suggested impairment. 
This Court's opinion in Yazzie is inapposite to this case. 
In sum, Sergeant Ledford received a 911 call indicating that defendant may have 
been intoxicated, and he then observed defendant driving in a manner that was consistent 
with his training regarding intoxicated drivers. Sergeant Ledford was entitled to draw 
reasonable inferences from his observations and his training, and this stop was therefore 
justified. The trial court's opinion should be affirmed. 
B. Sergeant Ledford also had reasonable suspicion that defendant had 
committed an act of domestic violence. 
Even if this Court holds that Sergeant Ledford did not have reasonable suspicion 
to investigate defendant for driving while under the influence, this Court should still hold 
that he had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant in order to investigate him for 
domestic violence.9 
Defendant's live-in girlfriend called 911 and told the dispatcher to have officers 
"get over here quick." R. 96: 1. She informed the dispatcher that defendant had "just 
9
 As noted above, while the trial court based its ruling on the 911 call, this Court 
can affirm the judgment on "on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." 
Rynhart, 2005 UT 84 at TflO. 
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about" assaulted her. R. 96: 1. As a result, the 911 dispatcher sent out a bulletin to 
officers reporting a "[m]ale and female verbally fighting, no weapons, both parties are 
very intoxicated." R. 54. 
Defendant's girlfriend admittedly never claimed that she had been physically 
struck. Contrary to defendant's claims, however, this does not mean that "no assaultive 
behavior had occurred" or that there had "been no domestic violence." Aplt Br. 11, 14. 
To the contrary, Utah law firmly recognizes that domestic violence can occur even in the 
absence of an actual physical blow. The Cohabitant Abuse Act defines "abuse" as 
"intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to cause a cohabitant physical harm or 
intentionally or knowingly placing a cohabitant in reasonable fear of imminent physical 
harm." Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(1) (West 2004) (emphasis added). The Cohabitant 
Abuse Act then states that "[w]hen any peace officer has reason to believe a cohabitant 
. . . is being abused, or that there is a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse, 
although no protective order has been issued, that officer shall use all reasonable means 
to prevent the abuse." Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-8(2) (West 2004). 
The Utah Code of Criminal Procedure similarly states that the term "domestic 
violence" includes "any criminal offense involving violence or physical harm or threat of 
violence or physical harm." Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1(2) (West 2004) (emphasis 
added). The Utah Criminal Code also generally defines the term "assault" to include "an 
attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another," as well as "a 
threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(l)(a) to -(b) (West 2004). In State v. Brown, 853 
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P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the court therefore affirmed a conviction for aggravated assault 
where the defendant had only raised a wrench in his hand and made threatening 
statements to the victim. Id. at 859-60. Defendant's suggestion that there could not have 
been a criminal investigation without an allegation of completed violence is therefore at 
odds with Utah's proactive, protective statutory scheme. 
It is unclear what defendant's girlfriend actually meant when she said that she was 
"just about" assaulted. She could have meant that defendant had tried to physically hit 
her but had missed (perhaps due to his inebriation). She could have instead meant that 
defendant had threatened to hit her before she called 911. She could have also meant that 
defendant had become so angry during their dispute that she had feared that he was about 
to hit her. She could have meant something else entirely. Although the caller did not 
explain exactly what she meant, she had started the call by telling the 911 dispatcher to 
"get over here quick," thus implying both seriousness and exigency, and she had 
informed the dispatcher that alcohol was involved, thus increasing the potential volatility 
of the situation. Under Utah's threat-based domestic violence approach, the caller's 
request that officers "get over here quick" because defendant had "just about assaulted" 
her at least gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that there had been a "fear" or "threat" of 
physical harm, thus justifying the stop. 
Defendant also suggests that the 911 call in this case was untrustworthy because 
defendant's girlfriend was likely "nervous" when she reported the domestic dispute. 
Aplt. Br. 11. According to defendant, "[t]he dispatcher must understand that when the 
911 call is made regarding a domestic dispute the caller generally overstates rather than 
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understates the situation." Aplt. Br. 11. Defendant offers no support for his suggestion 
that domestic violence victims are, as a class, more prone to exaggeration. Regardless, it 
is hard to see how a 91 1 filler w ho is reporting domestic \ lolence is going to be any 
more "nervous" than a caller who is reporting a sexual assault, or a homicide, or an 
ongoing violent crime. Defendant's argument would presumably require all of these calls 
to be treated with skepticism as well, I hereby resulting in a system where 911 assistance 
is more readily available to those with mundane problems than to those who are trul> in 
need of emergency help. This argument should be rejected. 
In addition, even if it were true that the 911 call itself was not independently 
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of lomestic violence, Sergeant I -edford's 
decision to pull defendant over was clearly based on more than just that isolated phone 
call. Sergeant Ledford followed defendant for several blocks prior to pulling him over 
and had observed defendant driving a slow, circuitous route while still in the area of his 
girlfriend's residence. R. 97: 8. According to Sergeant Ledford, "[a] lot of time we deal 
with [domestic violence] suspects that will leave the house initially, they'll wait to see if 
the police are going to show up and if the police don't show up within a few minutes, 
they tend to come back to the scene." R. 97: 8-9. In City of Grafton v. Swanson, 497 
N.W.2d 421 (N.D. 1993), the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized this very problem, 
holding that "[t]he likelihood of domestic violence, after a police officer has knowledge 
of its recent occurrence and the alleged offender's contemporaneoiis return to the scene 
after having been observed earlier in the day in an intoxicated state, prompts a valid and 
reasonable suspicion of the possibility that a crime is about to happen." Id. at 424. 
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Thus, Sergeant Ledford did not pull defendant over simply because of the 911 
report, but also because defendant appeared to be lingering in the area of a domestic 
dispute after the victim had called 911. The Supreme Court has expressly allowed 
officers to draw reasonable inferences that are based on their own specialized training 
and experiences. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. This is exactly what occurred here. This 
Court should accordingly hold that Sergeant Ledford had reasonable suspicion to initiate 
the investigatory stop. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted May l £ , 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RYA0/D. TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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